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TAXATION OF TRUST FUNDS WHERE INVASION OF
CORPUS OCCURS AND REMAINDER LEFT
TO CHARITY
By J. E. ROBINSON of the Denver Bar
AN interesting and important decision was handed down

by the Supreme Court of this state on May 15th, in
case No. 14425, entitled the People of the State of Colorado v. the Colorado National Bank, as Executor of the Estate of Frederick J. McCombe, Deceased. It is interesting in
determining the questions raised, and important in view of
similar situations which may arise in the future. As the opinion did not state very fully the facts in the case, but referred to
the record for those facts, it is necessary to state the facts as so
shown in order that the question presented may be fully understood.
Frederick J. McCombe died September 18, 1936, a resident of Denver, leaving a will and an estate of an agreed net
value of approximately $33,000.
He left a widow who was sixty-nine years of age, and her
life expectancy was 8.97 years. She is incurably insane, and
has been cared for in a sanitarium for some twelve or fifteen
years.
Under his will the testator left all of his property to the
Colorado National Bank in trust for the support of his wife
during her lifetime, and to the Denver Foundation for charitable uses after her death. The will in question provided for
the support of his wife as follows:
"Out of the moneys and property constituting, or which shall
thereafter constitute, the assets of this trust, meaning thereby both the
principal of said trust and the income therefrom, I do authorize, direct
and require my said trustee to furnish and expend for my beloved wife,
* * * during her natural lifetime, full, proper, adequate and comfort-

able support and maintenance, * * * and for that purpose I do hereby
authorize, direct and empower my said trustee to use, first, the income
from said trust fund for that purpose, and if the income shall not be
sufficient for that purpose then to use so much of the principal of said
fund as may be necessary fully and adequately to support and care for
my said wife so long as she lives."

The will further provided that upon the death of his said
wife the remainder should go to the Denver Foundation for
charitable purposes. The remainder going to the Denver
Foundation is exempt from an inheritance tax, and the amount
thereof when ascertained must be deducted from the gross

202

DICTA

203

estate under the authority of subsection (c) of section 26,
chapter 85, C. S. A., as amended in 1937, which provides that
there shall be deducted from the gross estate

"the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises or transfers * * *
to or for the use of aany corporation * * * organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. * * *

The Attorney General filed his report claiming an inheritance tax upon the entire assets of the estate, less the widow's
exemption. The County Court entered its customary ex parte
order fixing the amount of the inheritance tax in accordance
with the report of the Attorney General. Objections were
filed to the order upon which there was a hearing, as a result
of which the court determined that the estate was not liable
for any inheritance tax.
In the County Court, as well as in the Supreme Court,
the Attorney General contended that by reason of the permissible invasion of the corpus of the trust for the purpose of the
support of the widow, the amount which would ultimately
go to charity was so indefinite and uncertain that it could not
be deducted. The contention of the executor was that the
amount necessary for the support of the widow and, therefore,
the amount which would ultimately go to charity, was capable, of being ascertained and determined with reasonable certainty.
Upon the hearing of the objections in the County Court,
and after testimony was taken, the court found and determined
that the amount necessary for the support of the widow during her life expectancy was approximately $19,000, of which
approximately $7,000 would be paid from income, and the
balance of $12,000 must be paid from the corpus of the estate.
and that the remainder of the estate which would go to the
Denver Foundation for charitable purposes was over $21,000.
The law upon the question is fairly well settled, although
it has been the subject of numerous discussions, principally in
the federal courts under a federal statute similar to the one
quoted above. Perhaps the principal case is that of Ithaca
Trust Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 151, wherein the court stated
that if the amount which would go to charity could be ascertained with reasonable certainty, it was deductible. In that
case, however, as in other cases it was stated that the probable
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income from the trust would be sufficient to support the life
beneficiary, but there appears to be no case holding that the
fact that it is necessary to invade the corpus of the estate for
the support of the life beneficiary renders the bequest to charity
indefinite or uncertain. The Attorney General conceded that
if the income was sufficient to support the widow the corpus
of the trust which would go to charity could be deducted, but
insisted that when it was necessary to invade the corpus for
that purpose, no deduction could be made.
It was the contention of the executor that it is not material whether or not in any given case the corpus was invaded,
the sole question being the amount which would ultimately
go to charity whether the corpus of the fund was or was not
invaded, and the Supreme Court so held.
As stated, the question is of much importance, not only
to trust companies and others administering similar trusts, but
to men who desire to provide for the ample support of their
widows, leaving the balance to charity.
COURT RULES ORDINANCES OF HOME RULE
CITIES CONTROL TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
The Colorado State Motor Patrol, acting under authority of the motor vehicle act and the state statutes, cannot enforce a traffic violation committed under the state motor vehicle act when it occurs in the city limits of the home ruled city,
according to a ruling announced by Judge John B. O'Rourke
in a recent case decided by him in the District Court of La
Plata County.
In the particular case the defendant was charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and reckless driving, contrary to the motor vehicle act. In this case the court quashed the information on
the ground that the acts sought to be charged under the information in this particular case were acts in nature of traffic violation occurring within the limits of the City of Durango, and
were of a local or municipal nature and subject to the exclusive
control of the city itself. The court based its opinion upon
the question of whether or not the conduct sought to be controlled by the state statutes, as well as the ordinances of the
City of Durango, which is a home ruled city, is a matter of
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purely a local or municipal nature, affecting the city only, or
one of a general nature, affecting the interests of the people of
the State of Colorado as a whole.
The court took the position that the decisions indicate
that traffic regulation generally without reference to the specific charge alleged in the information is lodged exclusively in the
municipality. The court further pointed out that the 20th
Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colorado
grants to home ruled cities exclusive control without legislative interference in matters local and municipal. The court
reached the conclusion that the information charges acts relating to matters of traffic regulation, which are exclusively
under the control of the municipal authorities, because based
upon matters purely local and municipal in their nature.
Therefore, regulation was lodged in the City of Durango.
-R.

FRANKLIN MCKFLVEY, Correspondent.

LAWYER DISBARRED FOR AIDING UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE
Another case condemning the lawyer who aids unlawful practice
of the law, is the recent case of "In the matter of Paul E. Tuthill, an
attorney," before the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department, April, 1939, New York.
Tuthill was found to have aided in unlawful practices of a corporation known as Transatlantic Estates V- Credit Compaay, Inc., upon
an investigation being made of the activities of the corporation, in New
York. In 1930, the corporation was dissolved in New York, and reorganized in New Jersey, the respondent aiding in all of its work when
the corporation continued its unlawful activities in New York State,
Tuthill continuing to reside in New York City.
The court found that the sole business of the corporation was
searching out and procuring claims, furnishing counsel and legal advice
and that such activities constituted the unlawful practice of the law.
The Respondent was disbarred.
Jerome Smith of Fort Collins is part-time instructor at the Colorado State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts this semester. He
is teaching commercial law.

